The Constitutional Dialogue in Europe: A "political" dialogue

Abstract

Constitutional Courts have always been closely linked to the Court of Justice. The dialogue - via corresponding rulings - has never ceased to be central to the European integration process, for
example to create a catalogue for the protection of fundamental rights or to ensure the longevity of essential principles for EU Law effectiveness such as primacy. However, this dialogue has obviously taken a new turn since various Constitutional Courts have used propio motu, the preliminary reference procedure.

Paterson mainly uses the British example to assess the relevance of dialogue between the (new) British Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the EU. This explains a lot. It is hard to disagree with his statement in the "British context" and given a fantastic sociological investigation, but one can add nuance. Considering a larger spectrum encompassing the specifics of modern continental constitutionalism suggests that the relationship established between Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the EU thanks to the preliminary reference mechanism is eminently
political.

For what reasons do Constitutional Courts engage in direct dialogue with the CJEU? What has encouraged them to activate the preliminary reference mechanism under Article 267(3) TFEU? This
article will attempt to answer these questions and examine the follow up to the "integrated" dialogue embodied by this mechanism.